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Post-1918 Austria: A Case Study Applying Three Macro Models of Stein Rokkan

It is actually quite surprising that the twin concepts of center/periphery¹ - or more precisely centrality/peripherality - have traditionally been accorded such scant attention in historical research,² whereas, throughout many other fields of the social sciences such as geography, economics, sociology and anthropology, and even in jurisprudence and philosophy,³ territorial phenomena have been the focus of more or less intense consideration. This unwillingness on the part of history, and often of political science as well, to employ the categories of territory and center/periphery is even more astonishing in light of Fernand Braudel's reflections on this matter: "Territory as an interpretational point of departure influences all historical realities, all spatially-defined phenomena: states, societies, cultures and economies."⁴

It should be kept in mind that thinking in terms of categories of center/periphery indeed implies a hierarchical ordering of spatial relationships, be it in a horizontal (city - countryside, metropolis - rural outskirts, "motherland" - colony, urban center - suburbs, etc.) or in a vertical respect (e.g. economic dominance, political supremacy, social differentiation, cultural hegemony). Thus, with regard to "closed" economic (world) systems (*économie-mondes*), Fernand Braudel mentioned three essential characteristics which are relevant to our discussion of the topic of center/periphery:

- borders which circumscribe a zone, providing such a system of centrality/peripherality with its identity

¹ This is a revised and shortened version of a paper presented at the Austrian Historians' Convention in 1993: Gerhard Botz: Zentrum/Peripherie in der Politik der Ersten Republik: drei Makro-Modelle Stein Rokkans, in: Bericht über den 19. österreichischen Historikertag in Graz, Vienna 1994, pp. 150-160.

² However, for Austria, compare: Michael Mitterauer: Das Problem der zentralen Orte als sozial- und wirtschaftshistorische Forschungsaufgabe, in: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 58 (1971), also reprinted in: Michael Mitterauer: Markt und Stadt im Mittelalter, Stuttgart 1980, p.22 - 51; Ernst Hanisch: Provinz und Metropole. Gesellschaftsgeschichtliche Perspektiven der Beziehungen des Bundeslandes Salzburg zu Wien (1918 - 1934), in: Eberhard Zwink (ed.): Beiträge zur Föderalismusdiskussion, Salzburg 1981, p. 67 seqq.

³ Compare Henri Lefebvre: La production de l'espace, Paris 1974; Denis Retaillé: Géographie universelle: une quête prématurée, in: ÉspacesTemps. Le Journal, no. 49/59 (1992), p. 110 - 114.

⁴ Fernand Braudel: Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe - XVIIIe siècle, vol. 3, Paris 1979, p. 12.

- a (single, in the normal case) center which constitutes both a "metropolis," to use a term from the theory of imperialism,⁵ and a dominant market economy, and
- a pronounced hierarchy existing between, on one hand, a number of less prosperous, moderately advanced sub-economies on the periphery and, on the other, a more affluent economic system at the center. From this hierarchy emerge the fundamental inequalities and tensions which divide such a system into two camps, the "haves" and the "have-nots," and which account for the changes which the system undergoes over the long term.⁶

Immanuel Wallerstein, *the* historian of center/periphery models on a world-wide scale emphasizes two additional aspects beyond these above-mentioned attributes which are significant for our discussion: a world system does not contain only peripheries and a center, but rather semi-peripheries as well, and these elements oppose one another in intensive reciprocal relationships and division of labor. Beyond these are fringe areas not yet integrated within the system.⁷

Primarily with reference to the regions and nation-states of Western Europe during the second half of the 20th century, the noted Norwegian political sociologist Stein Rokkan (1921-1979) applied an analysis employing center/periphery relationships to "the endowment of resources [i.e. raw materials, capital, knowledge, symbolic capital etc.], distances and channels of communication. Typically, a center controls the bulk of the transactions among the holders of resources across a territory; it tends to be closer than any alternative site to the resource-rich areas within the territory; and it is able to dominate the communication flow through the territorial diffusion of a standard language and through its control of a set of institutions for consultation and direction. By contrast, a periphery controls at best its own resources, tends to be isolated from other regions, and contributes little to the total communication flow within the territory".⁸

A center is therefore frequently described as "the nexus of the decision making process, the command and control hub, the focal point of power",⁹ and, to the extent that

⁵ Compare Johan Galtung: Eine strukturelle Theorie des Imperialismus, in: Dieter Senghas (ed.): Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt, Frankfurt/M. 1972, p. 29 - 104; François Perroux: L'Economie de XXe siècle, Paris 1964.

⁶ Braudel, *Civilisations*, p. 16.

⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein: *The Modern World System* [vol.I], New York 1974, p. 3 seq.

⁸ Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin: *Economy, Territory, Identity*, London 1983, p. 14; Compare also [Stein Rokkan:] *The Centre-Periphery Polarity*, in: Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin: *Centre-Periphery-Structures in Europe. An ISSC Workbook in Comparative Analysis*, Frankfurt/M. 1987, p. 17 seqq.

⁹ Manfred Welan: *Zentrum und Peripherie*, in: Grete Klingenstein (ed.): *Krise des Fortschritts*, Wien 1984, p. 103 - 121, here p. 103; Compare also: Tonino Bettanini: *Spazio e scienze umane*, Florence 1976; Françoise P.-Lévy and Marion Segaud: *Anthropologie de l'espace*, Paris 1983.

it has achieved a certain magnitude, so to speak the geographic embodiment of the political system. It is posited by social geographers that, in order to carry out these functions, a center concentrates specialized personnel and organizations, bureaucracies, cultural and military elites, religious hierarchies, commercial institutions, transportation facilities etc. The usual statistical indicators of social conditions and trends used in historical studies are derived from such social geographic concepts.¹⁰

Center/periphery concepts have not only achieved broad acceptance in social geography, in which locality models using these ideas have been developed since the 1930's and have become central concepts in quantitative research and urban planning.¹¹ They have also proved to be highly productive conceptual tools in other fields, above all in the social scientific and historical research on mass-scale voting behavior and national-level political parties. Center/periphery concepts also became interesting for researchers, primarily in the 1960's, in some rather theoretical approaches to international economics, global politics, imperialism, dependence and similar subjects. At present, macro theories such as these also seem to be in a position to provide scholars with one of the few unifying principles for a modern world history whose procedures go beyond the mere additive or anecdotal. Rokkan adapted this fundamental conceptual pattern into diverse formulations depending upon the respective object of his investigative interest, so that it is not possible to speak of "the" or a single center/periphery theory in Rokkan's work.

In the following sections, I will briefly outline three of Rokkan's macro-historical models¹² which seem to be most relevant to the history of Austria. However, it is clear that this "inversion" of the process of constructing models in the social sciences - the application of theoretical models to an individual case for the purpose of an historical interpretation - is not unproblematic.¹³

¹⁰ Stein Rokkan et al.: *Nation-Building. A Review of Recent Comparative Research and a Select Bibliography of Analytical Studies*, The Hague 1971 (*Current Sociology*, vol. 19, no. 3), p. 33 seq.

¹¹ Compare Peter Schöller (ed.): *Zentralitätsforschung*, Darmstadt 1972 (This volume also includes a reprint of the innovative article: Walter Christaller: *Das System der zentralen Orte* (1933), p. 3 -22); Hans Bobek and Maria Fesl: *Das System der zentralen Orte Österreichs*, Vienna 1978.

¹² There is a multitude of models by Rokkan which are neither homogenous, nor without contradiction to each other, nor invariable over time, having been constantly modified by Rokkan himself. See: Stein Rokkan: *Eine Familie von Modellen für die vergleichende Geschichte Europas*, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. 9.2 (1980), p. 118 - 128. This is also the conclusion of Peter Flora: *Stein Rokkans Makro-Modell der politischen Entwicklung Europas: Ein Rekonstruktionsversuch*, in: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, vol. 33 (1981), p. 397 - 436.

¹³ From here onwards, I mainly follow my paper "Staatsbildungsprozesse und Zentrum-Peripherie-Probleme in der Ersten Republik", presented Nov. 13, 1981 at the conference of the "Wissenschaftliche Kommission ... zur Erforschung der Jahre 1918 bis 1938 in Vienna, on: "Federalism in Austria 1918 - 1938".

1. The Geohistorical "Reich" Paradox and Austria: Federalism and Central State

The objective of this approach, which derives its point of reference from an interpretational model developed in a later phase of Stein Rokkan's work, is to employ a comparative-macrohistorical perspective¹⁴ in order to shed new light on the internal structure of the Austrian state, specifically with regard to federalism/centralism and the collapse of democracy in the 1930's in the context of Austria's geopolitical situation since the Middle Ages. This interpretational model, which the Norwegian political sociologist first began developing in the middle of the 1970's, proceeds from a conceptual map of Europe and contains eight chief points which I will briefly summarize¹⁵:

1. A broad belt of trade routes and cities, from Northern Italy to the English Channel and the North Sea, particularly along the Rhine River, has stretched clear across Europe since the late Middle Ages and which, moreover, can still be discerned on contemporary economic, social and transportational land maps of Europe.¹⁶
2. This "city belt" was the chief area of influence of the Roman Catholic Church, with its closely knit network of cathedrals, monasteries and ecclesiastical principalities.
3. It was precisely this density of established urban and religious centers in this belt which made it difficult for any one of these centers to ascend to a position of dominance.
4. The establishment of the Holy Roman Empire likewise failed to bring about unification within this zone and its emperors remained weak; for this reason, a strong territorial state initially failed to emerge within this belt.
5. In contrast to these conditions, the formation of centers proved to be a simpler matter on both the western and eastern edges of the urban belt of the old "Reich." These centers were in a position not only to profit from the resources of the dense urban network's monetary economy but also to achieve control over peripheral territories which lay far beyond the central belt of trade routes.

¹⁴ It should be self-evident that this macro model itself and, to an even greater extent, its application to Austria must necessarily be generalized and extremely simplified. I am fully cognizant of the numerous objections it is likely to raise on the part of historians who adhere to an *historistisch* paradigm. In general compare Flora, Makro-Modell, p. 434; Charles Tilly: Stein Rokkan's Conceptual Map of Europe, Ann Arbor, Mich. 1981 (CRSO Working Papers no. 229), p. 2 seq.

¹⁵ For the first elaboration in a cartographic form, see: Bernt Hagtvet and Stein Rokkan: The Conditions of Fascist Victory: Towards a Geoeconomic-Geopolitical Model for the Explanation of Violent Breakdown of Competitive Mass Politics, in: Stein U. Larsen et al. (ed.): Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of Fascism and Nazism in Europe, Bergen 1980, p. 139.

¹⁶ Étienne Juillard and Henri Nonn: Éspaces et régions en Europe occidentale, Paris 1976 (Actions thématiques programmées, A.T.P., Nr. 10), mainly p. 22 seqq. and maps 2 - 8.

6. The earliest incidence of the formation of territorial states, therefore, was in the coastal plains of Western and Northern Europe (France, England, Scandinavia) and later in Spain.
7. Only during a second wave did centers and territorial states successfully emerge on the landward side: first under the Habsburgs in the core land of modern-day Austria, then in Sweden, finally and decisively in Germany beginning in Prussia.
8. The economically strong but politically weak belt of cities and small states in the middle remained disunited and violently disputed. A portion of the western edge was integrated into the Kingdom of France. In some regions of this zone, cities and other local political entities formed "consociational"¹⁷ alliances, of which the ultimately short-lived Hanseatic League, the Confederation of Helvetia and the United Netherlands are the foremost examples. For a time, it appeared as though the Habsburgs would gain control over substantial territories within the belt. It was, however, Berlin and Torino, centers located in the European semi-periphery, from which Prussia and Piedmont finally succeeded in uniting Germany and Italy in the 19th century.¹⁸

Depicted in the form of a conceptual map of the "state-economy dimension" in Western Europe during the early modern period, this configuration appeared as follows (see map):¹⁹

¹⁷ MacRae: *Consociational Democracy*, London 1969; Philipp Schmitter: *Corporatism in Europe*, Stanford 1986.

¹⁸ With slight simplifications and some additions, I mainly follow here Rokkan's own words which he repeated on several different occasions: Stein Rokkan: *Cities, States, Nations*, in: Samuel N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan (ed.): *Building States and Nations*, vol. 1, Beverly Hills 1973, p. 81; in general: Stein Rokkan: *Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building*, in: Charles Tilly (ed.): *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton 1975, p. 562 - 600.

¹⁹ Reprinted from: Hagtvet and Rokkan, *Conditions*, p. 139.

Map of Europe

What I would like to refer to as the geohistorical "*Reich*" paradox lies in the fact that this central European zone, although socially and economically most highly developed, remained "underdeveloped" with respect to the formation of a modern territorial state until the 19th century, such that urban and commercial centers were in a position to form strong centralized states only on the semi-periphery, with their spheres of control extending outward to the periphery. What consequences can be derived from this model for the process of state formation in Austria?

The provinces comprising the territory of modern-day Austria came into being not only as a result of noble families ultimately succeeding in the accumulation of possessions and titles. "Rather, to a much greater extent, the emergence of new territories *and* the new social entities which accompanied them" was the result of a social-historical process connected to the increasing importance of commerce and the cities.²⁰ The formation of provinces occurred at various times: earliest in Styria as well as in Salzburg and (Lower) Austria (from the middle of the 12th century to the first third of the 13th century respectively), followed by Tyrol and Carinthia (from the middle of the 13th and in the second third of the 14th century). Thus, this sequence tends to display an east-west gradient which, notwithstanding other explanations, could also conform to Rokkan's model: even the processes of province formation in Austria took place - though certainly not independent of long-term social forces and factors related to European geography²¹ - earlier on the edges of the urban belt than in regions which were within or closer to it.²² In this sense, though reversed, an Austrian province such as Salzburg, interpreted from a contemporary perspective, would thus be an example of an abortive state formation (as late as 1805/1815).

If we accept as true the widely held though unproved thesis advanced by numerous regional historians and province-level politicians that federalism and "*Landesbewußtsein*" (regional consciousness) in 20th century Austria are above all historically rooted, then it must also be assumed that those structural factors which had already been determinative in the historical processes of province formation were not (completely) eradicated under the Habsburgs. In the Austrian state, in which the

²⁰ Ernst Bruckmüller: Sozialgeschichte Österreichs, Vienna 1985, p. 104 seq.

²¹ Compare Jenő Szűcs: The Three Historical Regions of Europe, in: Acta Historica A.S.H., no.29 (1983), pp.131-183 (German: Die drei historischen Regionen Europas, Frankfurt/Main 1990); for a recent overview see: Erich Landsteiner: Europas innere Grenzen, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, vol.4, no.1 (1993), pp. 8-43; compare also István Bibó: Die Misere der osteuropäischen Kleinstaaterei, Frankfurt/Main 1992.

²² Compare Walter Jambor (ed.): Der Anteil der Bundesländer an der Nationswerdung Österreichs, Wien 1971; Friedrich Kojas: Entwicklungstendenzen des österreichischen Föderalismus, St. Pölten 1976.

process of state formation reached a preliminary conclusion only as late as 1848,²³ they may certainly continue to be operative today. Furthermore, the hypothesis can also be proposed that the strength of *Landesbewußtsein*, separatism and federalism, increasing the further west one goes in Austria (particularly at the outset of the First Republic), is also consistent with Rokkan's Model²⁴. If this were true, it would likewise conform to a dividing line, seemingly running clear across Austria from north to south approximately along the Pyhrn Pass line (Linz - Klagenfurt). This division, which is a more frequent subject of consideration by social geographers and folklorists than by sociologists and political scientists in Austria²⁵ deserves further empirical research. This boundary also seems to find expression in certain distinctive features which have characterized the Austrian political landscape until the recent past: in the West, a rather integrative consensus orientation in which many characteristics of the "ständisch" (estate) society seem to have been conserved ("liberal conservatism"); a rather centralist-standardizing political culture, though displaying tendencies and structures leading to political polarization and populism (Socialist and Social Christian mass politics) in the East.²⁶

2. Deferred Repercussions of the Failed Process of Empire Formation and Decline to the Level of the Semi-periphery: Authoritarianism

The essential aim of the method of the conceptual map of European states is to explain the extremely diverse party systems in Europe and the highly divergent paths which the processes of democratization has taken there (aside from the area of communist domination prior to 1989). This of course includes, conversely, hypotheses addressing the subject of the violent interruptions of democratization - the collapse of democracies and the establishment of dictatorships.²⁷ Indeed, Rokkan has put forth a number of different solutions to these questions, which were rather peripheral to his work; and which deserve further testing by detailed research with respect to Austria. The following

²³ Ernst Bruckmüller: *Nation Österreich*, Vienna 1984, p. 68.

²⁴ See Stein Rokkan: *Territories, Centres, and Peripheries: Toward a Geoethnic-Geoeconomic-Geopolitical Model of Differentiation within Western Europe*, in: Jean Gottmann (ed.): *Centre and Periphery. Spatial Variation in Politics*, Beverly Hills 1980, p. 163 - 204, mainly p. 187.

²⁵ Compare Melany Sully: *Modern Politics in Austria*, London 1990.

²⁶ In contrast to Emmanuel Todd: *L'invention de l'Europe*, Paris 1990, p. 433seqq.; compare this against: Hans Bobek: *Österreichs Regionalstruktur im Spiegel des Atlas der Republik Österreich*, o.O., o.J. [ca. 1970].

²⁷ Here, Rokkan draws similar conclusions, though starting from a different approach, like: Barrington Moore: *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Harmondsworth 1967.

factors, contained in a European political model employing Rokkan's concepts of center/periphery, are relevant to the collapse of democracy: ²⁸

- The fact that Austria has constituted a core component of the Catholic-universalistic "world," implicit in which are early state formation though late nation building, a weak mass mobilization for democracy and specific attempts at a (Catholic) mobilization "from above."
- This also implies the strength of absolutism during the phase of social modernization and a deep-seeded and long-lasting breach of "ständisch" traditions of self-determination which persisted from the 17th to the early 20th century.
- Furthermore, the Habsburg empire assumed the character of a "crusader" state in opposition to the Turks.
- In contrast to the democracies of Western and Northwestern Europe, in which a phase of parliamentary government typically preceded mass-level democratization, this sequence of decisive steps in the process of political modernization was exactly reversed. That is to say, the introduction of universal suffrage (for men) occurred prior to the establishment of an effective parliamentary form of government, whereby turn-of-the-century Austria proved to be following a „Sonderweg“ (special way) more similar to the German model.

It was only in the late 1970's that Rokkan, in collaboration with Bernt Hagtvet, made an explicit and extremely comprehensive attempt²⁹ to apply his model to the explanation of "violent breakdown of competitive mass politics," thus to the establishment of fascist and authoritarian regimes, and to reformulate his previous models.³⁰ The essential points of this model variant are:

All five cases of such dictatorships - Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Portugal - either lay within the urban belt or were historically closely linked to it. Despite the numerous highly divergent geoeconomic and geopolitical characteristics - which doubtlessly constitutes one of the weaknesses of this model - these states nevertheless display three characteristics in common:

²⁸ Compare Gerhard Botz: Der "4. März 1933" als Konsequenz ständischer Strukturen, ökonomischer Krisen und autoritärer Tendenzen, in: Gerhard Botz: Krisenzonen einer Demokratie, Frankfurt/M. 1987, p. 155 - 180; also, most recently Ernst Hanisch: Der lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna 1994, p. 24 seq.

²⁹ Hagtvet and Rokkan, Conditions, p. 131 - 152.

³⁰ In doing so, he relied increasingly upon Wallerstein's concept, referred to above, of the semiperiphery and the decline into such a condition in a political-economic respect.

- Persistent strength of an imperial heritage stemming from the land's geopolitical position (city belt) and from failed ambitions toward empire formation in the respective phases of their histories;
- Decline to the status of a semi-periphery as a result of the developmental process of a capitalist world economic system which had been underway since the 16th century and a series of hegemonic conflicts with the "new" economic powers of Northwest Europe, primarily England and the Netherlands, to a limited extent France as well³¹;
- A sociopolitical alliance of state formational factors (ruler, military and centralized bureaucracy) with aristocratic proprietors of large landed estates and a majority of the industrial bourgeoisie, in the manner of Bismarck's "blood and iron."³²

At least until 1939, therefore, "the chances for the *survival* of competitive multiparty politics was greatest within the *core* of the world economy," while conversely "the likelihood of fascist-type victories was greatest in the semi-peripheralized territories of earlier city-studded empires." And then, closely following the theories of Barrington Moore, Rokkan and Hagtvet come to the conclusion that "the probability of *communist-type* victories was greatest in the much more markedly *peripheral* areas of earlier empires of the 'agrarian bureaucracy' type, empires with poorly developed commercial-industrial bourgeoisies."³³

Indeed, this model could have achieved a higher degree of precision had it attributed increased significance to the decisive differentiation between "Catholic" political cultures and those of a reformational Protestant character, a contrast otherwise given such strong emphasis by Rokkan in the processes of state formation and nation building. This would have made possible an explanation of essential characteristics and differences of regime typology, discriminating between the repressiveness of mass mobilizing, nationalist-"*völkisch*" national socialism and the more or less authoritarian, "Catholic-type" dictatorships which are often simply, and quite improperly, subsumed under the category of "fascism." As inadequate as this interpretational approach may be with respect to the Austrian "Corporatist State," it clearly deserves further pursuit in connection with the Eastern and East Central European regimes of the interwar period.

³¹ Cfr. Immanuel Wallerstein: *The Modern World-System*, vol. II, New York 1980, p. 231seqq.; now also Immanuel Wallerstein: *The Modern World-System*, vol. III, San Diego 1989.

³² For a more detailed development, also see the unpublished manuscript: Bernt Hagtvet: "Alliance Configurations in the Decisive Phase of Nation Building: Some Notes on Germany, Italy, Spain and Austria for the Explanation of Violent Breakdown of Competitive Mass Politics", (Bergen 1978).

³³ Rokkan and Hagtvet, *Conditions*, p. 149 (italics by the authors).

3. Historical Roots of Patterns of Sociopolitical Coalitions: The Limited Capacity for Action of Democratic Government in the First Republic

Finally, an additional, "early" variant of Rokkan's center/periphery model is applicable to the political situation of the interwar era, and indeed to the constellations of governmental and political power during this eventful 20-year period of revolution, coalition and dictatorship.

Rokkan's chief interpretational objective in this theoretical variant was to once again have recourse to factors emerging from the distant historical past in order to explain the configuration of party and governmental systems in the nation-states west of the divide between the former communist and non-communist systems of 20th century Europe. Rokkan attempted to apply this theory to a comparative data base on a broad, international and national scale,³⁴ thereby achieving notoriety primarily among analysts of voting behavior and political scientists. It is beyond the scope of this paper to sketch this model's wide-ranging theoretical foundations with respect to modernization and political systems.³⁵ Of sole significance in our present context is Rokkan's work in tracing party systems back to fundamental sociopolitical cleavages which have taken shape and been passed on during the multifarious process of modernization since the beginning of the modern period and are based upon even older sociohistorical (see part 1 above) and linguistic-cultural patterns. Rokkan sees the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the "democratic revolutions" occurring from the end of the 18th century and the Industrial Revolution as decisive factors. His model differentiates among the following sociopolitical variables, represented by the following abbreviations (in parentheses³⁶):

(N) - The process begins with a hard core of "nation-state formative elements" which control the essential elements of the emerging machinery of state;

[C] - A national church which establishes itself within the territory of a state during the course of the Reformation and assumes an important role in the formation of the

³⁴ Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan: Cleavage Structure, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction, in: Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan: Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, New York 1967, p. 1 - 64, mainly p. 36 seqq.

³⁵ For a well-argued critique, see: Charles Tilly: Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, New York, especially p. 125 - 143; compare also: Stefan Immerfall: Sozialer Wandel in der Moderne. Neuere Forschungsergebnisse zum Prozeß gesellschaftlicher Modernisierung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, in: Neue Politische Literatur, vol. 36 (1991), p. 5 - 48.

³⁶ In the schema reproduced below, weak socio-political factors are placed in parentheses (). The symbol A, an expansion which I have introduced, is placed in braces { }. Model variables which are not relevant for Austria are placed in brackets []. The variable "Sî - Secularisation as an option of "Nî has been completely omitted for the case of Austria.

national cultural character (not relevant for Austria as protestantism was defeated during the Counter-Reformation period);

(R) - The universally oriented Roman Catholic church with its transnational hierarchy whose influence upon society was decisively fixed during the Counter-Reformation;

[D] - A group of dissenting religious nonconformists, likewise in the case of Austria an immaterial consideration or one that comes into play only in connection with crypto-Protestants and peripheral pockets of Protestant resistance;³⁷

(L) - A group of aristocratic proprietors of large landed estates cooperating with the nation-state formative elements;

(U) - An urban bourgeoisie emerging during the course of the Industrial Revolution which controls the growing commercial and industrial sector and constitutes a powerful countervailing force to the landed aristocracy (With regard to Central and Eastern Europe, it appears to be a deficit of Rokkan's model that it does not take into account the existence of a Jewish bourgeoisie prior to 1939/44.);

{A} - A political entity representing the working class and opposing the class interests of the bourgeoisie.³⁸ This group, in turn, went through a process of splintering in certain countries after 1917;

(P) - And finally, a social-political periphery factor which - by definition - attempts to offer resistance against the factors tending to subjugate it to the control of the center.

³⁷ Margarethe Haydter and Johann Mayr: Regionale Zusammenhänge zwischen Hauptwiderstandsgebieten zur Zeit der Gegenreformation und den Julikämpfen 1934 in Oberösterreich, in: Bericht über den 15. österreichischen Historikertag 1982 in Salzburg, [without place] 1984, p. 406 - 421.

³⁸ For reasons we do not know, Rokkan did not explicitly specify this group, whose existence can be clearly derived from lines of reasoning presented elsewhere in his model; in contrast to this, see Flora, p. 429.

From the preceding factors, the following schema can be derived for our investigation of sociopolitical coalitions in Austria:

Schema of Sociopolitical Coalitions 1918 - 1938

SUB- PERIODS	Centrality/Peripherality of Sociopolitical Forces:	
	central / semi-central	: semi-peripheral / peripheral

pre-1918	N + L + R + (U)	:	(U) + P + A
1918-20	A + (P) + (N) + (U)	:	R + L + (P)
1921-29/32	(N) + U + (R)	:	(A) + P + L
1933-38	N + L + R + (U)	:	(U) + P + A

To express in words the meaning of this schema: In the final phase of the Habsburg empire, the traditional formative elements of the Austrian nation-state - imperial court, bureaucracy and military - in cooperation with the major groups of (non-German speaking) landed aristocracy and the Catholic Church as well as with segments of the liberal and German nationalist bourgeoisie (U) controlled the center both with regard to political power as well to the economy and social-hierarchy. The non-German speaking bourgeois groups, the traditional rural populace and the labor movement were peripheral or tended to peripherality.

The effect of the disintegration of the multiethnic Habsburg state was that the new Austrian state inherited the majority of the preexisting social and political structures, in addition to new problems stemming from the collapse of its integrated commercial

sphere. Not the least among these was that the center, Vienna,³⁹ became even more dominant within the new territorial framework than it had previously been, which inevitably provoked intensified resistance from the periphery. In this situation, the "Austrian Revolution" temporarily brought forth a new sociopolitical coalition at its center: namely, the Social Democratic Workers' Party, which had been dominant for several months, and their Christian-Social coalition partners, representing the periphery and, above all, the provinces, both of whom had to rely to a certain extent upon the support of the traditional state bureaucracy and the urban bourgeoisie. The political as well as spatial periphery was now occupied by the Catholic clergy and the aristocratic proprietors of large landed estates who, along with other resistance elements, were not prepared to accept the new republican-democratic political conditions.⁴⁰

With the end of the coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Social-Christians (1920) and the economic austerity measures resulting from the Geneva Protocols (1922) for the stabilization of the Austrian finances, there began a process of regrouping of the power combination in control of the center. The state bureaucracy together with the urban bourgeoisie and centrist elements of the Christian-Social party gained increased significance. The Catholic Church also won renewed importance. The province-level Social Christians were now once again rather peripheralized. Large land owners, in spite of their involvement in the *Heimwehr*, the rightist armed militia movement, were unable to advance to the center of power. The Social Democratic labor movement declined to the level of an internal semi-periphery despite the fact that, based on their main point of geographical concentration, they were a central factor.

With the increasing concentration of power in the executive branch of government since the end of the 1920's and the establishment of the authoritarian "Corporatist State" under Dollfuß and Schuschnigg,⁴¹ the system of sociopolitical power was toppled once again. Elements of the state bureaucracy, the *Heimwehr*, the aristocracy, the Catholic clergy and segments of the bourgeoisie controlled the state in centralist-authoritarian fashion. The traditional rural populace on the spatial periphery, despite the promise of full integration of all classes and economic sectors in the "corporatist state," remained politically and socially marginalized. Exactly the same can be said for the "Marxist" working class.

³⁹ Compare Hannes Hofbauer: Österreich zwischen Metropole und Peripherie. Ökonomische Integrationsprozesse seit der Ersten Republik, in: Österreich auf dem Weg zur 3. Republik: Zwischen "Deutschnationalismus" und "Habsburger-Mythos", Vienna 1992, p. 71 - 83.

⁴⁰ Compare Gerhard Botz: Gewalt in der Politik, 2nd ed., Munich 1983.

⁴¹ Compare Ulrich Kluge: Der österreichische Ständestaat, Wien 1983;

During the World Economic Crisis there arose, however, within a substantial segment of the middle classes (in the broadest sense of the word) a new and, with external support in March, 1938, finally victorious factor of political power: National Socialism. It first had gained mass support as a semi-peripheral phenomenon⁴² before achieving a breakthrough into the center of political power.

By comparing the sociopolitical coalition schema of the phase of the bourgeois coalition government (1921-1929/32) which I have developed here with that of the stable democracies of Western and Northern Europe found in Rokkan's work,⁴³ it is possible to advance the following hypothesis: in contradiction to an interpretational pattern which has found wide acceptance among scholars of modern Austrian history,⁴⁴ the power configuration of the 1920's in Austria had had better chances to preserve democracy than the preceding power pattern of the grand coalition government of Social Democrats and Social Christians. This also implies that the breakup of this coalition did not lead automatically to civil war and dictatorial rule.

However, the historical preconditions, going back as far as the Counter-Reformation, were unfavorable for the development of such a combination. In the context of the prevailing symbiosis of Church and State, which had only been weakened or temporarily interrupted by the reforms of Joseph II, the formation of a secularized bourgeoisie which was not pan-German but rather oriented toward an Austrian nation, would have been extremely difficult to say the least. But only this could have lent support to a process of an Austrian nation building as early as in the interwar period. It must also be assumed then that the "revolutionary" constellation in Austria had likewise been too radical and unstable. And the "corporatist state" would then have in fact been a type of attempted revival of the *ancien régime*.

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that all system-threatening fascist movements, as has also been confirmed by preliminary analyses of voting behavior,⁴⁵ have emerged

⁴² Franziska Schneeberger: Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr in Österreich. Eine vergleichend-politische Sozialgeschichte der Heimwehrbewegung, unpublished Ph. Diss., Univ. of Salzburg 1988; Gerhard Botz: Quantitative Analyse der Sozial- und Altersstruktur der österreichischen NSDAP-Mitglieder (1926-1945); in: *Austriaca. Cahiers universitaires d'information sur l'Autriche*, no. 26 (1988), p. 63-72; see also Johannes Dressel: Sozialstruktur einer NS-Elite: die österreichischen Abgeordneten zum Großdeutschen Reichstag 1938, in: Bericht über den 16. Historikertag 1984 in Krems/Donau, o.O. 1985, p. 644 - 655.

⁴³ Lipset and Rokkan, *Cleavage Structure*, p. 37.

⁴⁴ For instance Norbert Leser: *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus*, 2nd ed., Vienna 1985.

⁴⁵ See the contribution of Gerhard Botz and Albert Müller: 'Zentren und Peripherien' im Lichte der Wahlergebnisse der Ersten Republik, in: Bericht über den 19. österreichischen Historikertag in Graz, Vienna 1994, p. 545-559.

from the semi-periphery. Following their takeover of power, however, they have renounced their periphery-based interests in favor of a new and even more extremely dictatorial centralism.

Interpretational approaches such as these certainly permit an extension of their range of geographical application to the region of the post-Communist states. This would indeed raise completely new problems with respect to the adaptation and further development of Rokkan's macro models. It might also lead, if not to their falsification as general interpretational patterns, then to the elaboration of an extended center/periphery grammar along the lines of Rokkan's work.⁴⁶

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